Because of the traditional conceptualization of delusion as “irrational belief,” cognitive models of delusions largely focus on impairments to domain-general reasoning. Nevertheless, current rationality-impairment models do not account for the fact that (a) equivalently irrational beliefs can be induced through adaptive social cognitive processes, reflecting social integration rather than impairment; (b) delusions are overwhelmingly socially themed; and (c) delusions show a reduced sensitivity to social context both in terms of how they are shaped and how they are communicated. Consequently, we argue that models of delusions need to include alteration to coalitional cognition—processes involved in affiliation, group perception, and the strategic management of relationships. This approach has the advantage of better accounting for both content (social themes) and form (fixity) of delusion. It is also supported by the established role of mesolimbic dopamine in both delusions and social organization and the ongoing reconceptualization of belief as serving a social organizational function.

中文翻译：

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去理性化妄想

由于妄想的传统概念化为“非理性信念”，妄想的认知模型主要关注领域一般推理的障碍。然而，当前的理性-损害模型并没有考虑到这样一个事实：(a) 等价的非理性信念可以通过适应性社会认知过程诱发，反映社会整合而不是损害；(b) 妄想是压倒性的社会主题；(c) 妄想表现出对社会环境的敏感性降低，无论是在如何塑造和交流方面。因此，我们认为妄想模型需要包括对联盟认知的改变——涉及从属关系、群体感知和关系战略管理的过程。这种方法的优点是可以更好地解释妄想的内容（社会主题）和形式（固定性）。它还得到中脑边缘多巴胺在妄想和社会组织中的既定作用以及作为社会组织功能服务的信念的持续重新概念化的支持。