Abstract: Unbundling of vertically integrated utilities has become an integral element in the regulation of network industries and has been implemented in many jurisdictions. The idea of separating the network, as the natural monopoly, from downstream retailing, which may be exposed to competition, is still subject to contentious debate, as there is much empirical evidence that unbundling eliminates economies of vertical integration, though evidence on overall price effects is still lacking. In this paper, we study the effect of legal unbundling on grid charges in the German electricity distribution industry. Using panel data on German distribution system operators (DSOs), we exploit the variation in the timing of the implementation of legal unbundling and the fact that not all DSOs had to implement unbundling measures. We are also able to identify heterogeneous effects of legal unbundling for different types of price regulation because we observe a switch in the price regulation regime from rate-of-return regulation to incentive regulation during our observation period. Our findings suggest that legal unbundling of the network stage significantly decreases grid charges in the range of 5% to 9%, depending on the type of price regulation in place.

中文翻译：

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捆绑，监管和定价：来自配电的证据

摘要：垂直集成公用事业的捆绑已成为网络行业监管中不可或缺的组成部分，并已在许多辖区实施。将网络作为自然垄断从下游零售中分离出来的想法仍然存在争议，因为有很多经验证据表明，分拆消除了纵向整合的经济，尽管有关于整体价格影响的证据，但仍存在争议。仍然缺乏。在本文中，我们研究了法律分拆对德国配电行业中的电网收费的影响。使用关于德国配电系统运营商（DSO）的面板数据，我们利用了法律捆绑实施的时间变化以及并非所有DSO都必须实施捆绑措施这一事实。我们还能够确定不同类型的价格监管对法律解除捆绑的异质影响，因为在观察期内我们观察到价格监管机制从回报率监管向激励监管的转变。我们的发现表明，根据现行价格监管的类型，合法地将网络阶段捆绑销售可将电网收费大大降低5％至9％。