The paper presents an attempt to integrate the classical evolutionary game theory based on replicator dynamics and the state-based approach of Houston and McNamara. In the new approach, individuals have different heritable strategies; however, individuals carrying the same strategy can differ in terms of state, role or the situation in which they act. Thus, the classical replicator dynamics is completed by the additional subsystem of differential equations describing the dynamics of transitions between different states. In effect, the interactions described by game structure, in addition to the demographic payoffs (constituted by births and deaths), can lead to the change in state of the competing individuals. Special cases of reversible and irreversible incremental stage-structured models, where the state changes can describe energy accumulation, developmental steps or aging, are derived for discrete and continuous versions. The new approach is illustrated using the example of the Owner-Intruder game with explicit dynamics of the role changes. The new model presents a generalization of the demographic version of the Hawk-Dove game, with the difference being that the opponents in the game are drawn from two separate subpopulations consisting of Owners and Intruders. Here, the Intruders check random nest sites and play the Hawk-Dove game with the Owner if they are occupied. Meanwhile, the Owners produce newborns that become Intruders, since they must find a free nest site to reproduce. An interesting feedback mechanism is produced via the fluxes of individuals between the different subpopulations. In addition, the population growth suppression mechanism resulting from the fixation Bourgeois strategy is analyzed.

本文尝试将基于复制器动力学的经典进化博弈论与休斯顿和麦克纳马拉的基于状态的方法相结合。在新方法中，个体有不同的遗传策略；然而，实施相同战略的个人在他们所处的状态、角色或情况方面可能有所不同。因此，经典的复制器动力学由描述不同状态之间转换动力学的附加微分方程子系统完成。实际上，除了人口收益（由出生和死亡构成）之外，博弈结构描述的交互作用还可能导致竞争个体状态的变化。可逆和不可逆增量阶段结构模型的特殊情况，其中状态变化可以描述能量积累，发展步骤或老化，是为离散和连续版本派生的。使用所有者-入侵者游戏的示例说明了新方法，该游戏具有角色变化的显式动态。新模型呈现了 Hawk-Dove 游戏人口统计版本的概括，不同之处在于游戏中的对手来自两个独立的亚群，包括所有者和入侵者。在这里，入侵者会随机检查巢穴，如果被占领，则与主人玩鹰鸽游戏。同时，业主生产的新生儿成为入侵者，因为他们必须找到一个免费的巢穴进行繁殖。一个有趣的反馈机制是通过不同亚群之间个体的流动产生的。此外，