In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of agents' private types. The revelation principle asserts that if a social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism in equilibrium, then there exists a direct mechanism that can truthfully implement it. This paper aims to propose a failure of the revelation principle. We point out that in any game the format of each agent's strategy is either an informational message or a realistic action. The main result is that: For any given social choice function, if the mechanism which implements it has action-format strategies, then "\emph{honest and obedient}" will not be the equilibrium of the corresponding direct mechanism. Consequently, the revelation principle fails when the format of each agent's strategy is an action.

中文翻译：

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当每个智能体的策略格式为一个动作时，启示原则失效

在机制设计理论中，设计者希望实现一个社会选择函数，该函数为代理的每个可能的私有类型配置文件指定她最喜欢的结果。启示性原则断言，如果一个社会选择函数可以通过均衡的机制来实现，那么就存在一个可以如实实现它的直接机制。本文旨在提出启示原则的失败。我们指出，在任何游戏中，每个代理的策略格式要么是信息性消息，要么是现实的行动。主要结果是：对于任何给定的社会选择函数，如果实现它的机制具有动作格式策略，那么“\emph{诚实和服从}”将不是相应直接机制的均衡。最后，