We study supplier–buyer relationships in smallholder agri-food supply chains with equity concerns and under stakeholder engagement. We develop a game theoretic model to study the impact of these socially responsible practices in investment and pricing decisions. We model this as a Stackelberg game and study the impacts of the power structure in the outcomes. Our work was motivated by the business model of socially responsible Mexican company Fractal Café. We provide closed form expressions for the optimal wholesale and retail prices, and numerically study the effect of the model parameters. We show that equity concerns drive a redistribution of the profit towards an equitable outcome, but they do not have the same effect on the investment decisions. Additionally, we show that equity concerns may reverse the advantage of the game leader and transfer utility to the follower. We identify the settings under which the introduction of socially responsible practices increases the total supply chain profit by reducing the double marginalization effect. We find that capacity constraints result in a higher retail price, achieved by increasing the leader’s margin. Finally, we show that a two-part tariff contract with equity concerns is only convenient for the game follower when the leader has a high concern for advantageous inequity.

我们研究有权益问题且在利益相关者参与下的小农农业食品供应链中的供应商与买方关系。我们开发了一种博弈论模型来研究这些对社会负责的做法对投资和定价决策的影响。我们将其建模为Stackelberg游戏，并研究权力结构对结果的影响。我们的工作是受具有社会责任感的墨西哥公司FractalCafé的商业模式激励的。我们提供最佳批发和零售价格的封闭式表达式，并通过数值研究模型参数的效果。我们表明，股权问题驱使利润重新分配，以实现公平的结果，但它们对投资决策的影响不同。另外，我们表明，股权问题可能会扭转游戏领导者的优势，并将效用转移给追随者。我们确定了采用社会责任行为的环境，通过减少双重边缘化效应来增加总供应链利润。我们发现，产能受限会导致零售价上涨，这是通过提高领导者的利润来实现的。最后，我们表明，只有当领导者高度关注有利的不平等性时，具有权益问题的两部分资费合同才对游戏追随者有利。通过提高领导者的利润来实现。最后，我们表明，只有当领导者高度关注有利的不平等性时，具有权益问题的两部分资费合同才对游戏追随者有利。通过提高领导者的利润来实现。最后，我们表明，只有当领导者高度关注有利的不平等性时，具有权益问题的两部分资费合同才对游戏追随者有利。