We present a techno-economic analysis of a cellular market that operates within the licensed shared access (LSA) framework, consisting of a mobile network operator (MNO) that leases spectrum to a number of programme making and special events (PMSE) users. The MNO offers two quality-of-service (QoS) classes (high and low), differentiating the price based on the QoS class. The key question that we address is whether and to which extent the MNO has incentive to adopt this form of QoS-aware pricing. After getting some promising insights from the analysis of two case studies, we propose a general methodology. The first step is to model the parameters that are controlled by each PMSE user: (i) the way to choose between the two QoS classes and (ii) the available budget per QoS class. The second step is to compute the maximum revenue of the MNO. Our analysis reveals that the MNO can always tune the prices so as to maximise its revenue for the scenario where all users belong to the high QoS class. This is a consistent result throughout our study that holds for any considered set of user-controlled parameters and of technical parameters. We conclude that the adoption of QoS-aware pricing in an LSA market generates a tussle between the MNO and the regulator. The MNO has incentive to support fewer users but with high QoS and charge them more, which is not aligned with the regulator’s goal for social welfare maximisation.

我们介绍了在许可共享访问（LSA）框架内运作的蜂窝市场的技术经济分析，该框架由移动频谱运营商（MNO）组成，该网络将频谱租借给许多节目制作和特殊活动（PMSE）用户。MNO提供两种服务质量（QoS）类（高和低），根据QoS类区分价格。我们要解决的关键问题是MNO是否以及在何种程度上有动机采用这种形式的QoS感知定价。从两个案例研究的分析中获得了一些有希望的见解之后，我们提出了一种通用方法。第一步是对每个PMSE用户控制的参数建模：（i）在两个QoS类之间进行选择的方式，以及（ii）每个QoS类可用的预算。第二步是计算MNO的最大收益。我们的分析表明，在所有用户都属于高QoS级别的情况下，MNO始终可以调整价格，从而最大限度地提高其收入。这是贯穿我们研究的一致结果，适用于任何经过考虑的用户控制参数集和技术参数集。我们得出的结论是，在LSA市场中采用QoS感知定价会在MNO和监管机构之间产生争执。移动网络运营商有动机去支持更少的用户，但是拥有较高的QoS并向他们收取更多费用，这与监管机构实现社会福利最大化的目标不符。这是贯穿我们研究的一致结果，适用于任何经过考虑的用户控制参数集和技术参数集。我们得出的结论是，在LSA市场中采用QoS感知定价会在MNO和监管机构之间产生争执。移动网络运营商有动机去支持更少的用户，但是拥有较高的QoS并向他们收取更多费用，这与监管机构实现社会福利最大化的目标不符。这是贯穿我们研究的一致结果，适用于任何经过考虑的用户控制参数集和技术参数集。我们得出的结论是，在LSA市场中采用QoS感知定价会在MNO和监管机构之间产生争执。移动网络运营商有动机去支持更少的用户，但是拥有较高的QoS并向他们收取更多费用，这与监管机构实现社会福利最大化的目标不符。