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Stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium seeking under partial-decision information
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-11-10 , DOI: arxiv-2011.05357 Barbara Franci and Sergio Grammatico
arXiv - CS - Computer Science and Game Theory Pub Date : 2020-11-10 , DOI: arxiv-2011.05357 Barbara Franci and Sergio Grammatico
We consider for the first time a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium
problem, i.e., with expected-value cost functions and joint feasibility
constraints, under partial-decision information, meaning that the agents
communicate only with some trusted neighbours. We propose several distributed
algorithms for network games and aggregative games that we show being special
instances of a preconditioned forward-backward splitting method. We prove that
the algorithms converge to a generalized Nash equilibrium when the forward
operator is restricted cocoercive by using the stochastic approximation scheme
with variance reduction to estimate the expected value of the pseudogradient.
中文翻译:
部分决策信息下的随机广义纳什均衡寻求
我们第一次考虑随机广义纳什均衡问题,即在部分决策信息下具有期望值成本函数和联合可行性约束,这意味着代理仅与一些受信任的邻居进行通信。我们为网络游戏和聚合游戏提出了几种分布式算法,我们展示了它们是预处理前向后向分裂方法的特殊实例。我们通过使用方差减少的随机逼近方案来估计伪梯度的期望值,证明了当前向算子被限制cocoercive 时,算法收敛到广义纳什均衡。
更新日期:2020-11-12
中文翻译:
部分决策信息下的随机广义纳什均衡寻求
我们第一次考虑随机广义纳什均衡问题,即在部分决策信息下具有期望值成本函数和联合可行性约束,这意味着代理仅与一些受信任的邻居进行通信。我们为网络游戏和聚合游戏提出了几种分布式算法,我们展示了它们是预处理前向后向分裂方法的特殊实例。我们通过使用方差减少的随机逼近方案来估计伪梯度的期望值,证明了当前向算子被限制cocoercive 时,算法收敛到广义纳什均衡。