Abstract At present, the research on relevant decision-making considering the loss risk/ default risk in trade credit is on the rise This paper presents a supply chain model with a risk-averse retailer and a supplier offering loss sharing and trade credit in a supplier-Stackelberg game where the decision variables are the optimal order quantity and loss sharing ratio. The model is analyzed and compared to a newsvendor model without loss sharing and trade credit. Meanwhile, we provide a numerical example and sensitivity analysis to obtain managerial insights. We determine the trend and sensitivity hierarchies between the parameters and the optimal results. The main novelty and contribution of the paper can be demonstrated in two aspects. First, the risk tolerance largely affects the profit of supply chain members, therefore, we incorporate risk-averse parameter into trade credit policy. Second, we incorporate loss sharing into the supplier-Stackelberg game with trade credit for a loss-averse retailer. The findings highlight that for a risk-averse retailer, the supplier can improve the retailer’s utility and its own profits through trade credit and loss sharing.

中文翻译：

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供应商-斯塔克伯格博弈中贸易信用下的损失厌恶零售商-供应商供应链模型

摘要 目前，考虑贸易信用损失风险/违约风险的相关决策研究正在兴起 本文提出了风险规避零售商和供应商在供应商中提供损失分担和贸易信用的供应链模型。 -Stackelberg 博弈，其中决策变量是最佳订单数量和损失分担率。对该模型进行分析并与没有损失分担和贸易信用的报摊模型进行比较。同时，我们提供了一个数值例子和敏感性分析，以获得管理见解。我们确定参数和最佳结果之间的趋势和敏感性层次。论文的主要新颖性和贡献可以体现在两个方面。首先，风险承受能力很大程度上影响供应链成员的利润，因此，我们将风险规避参数纳入贸易信贷政策。其次，我们将损失分担纳入供应商-Stackelberg 博弈中，并为厌恶损失的零售商提供贸易信用。调查结果强调，对于规避风险的零售商，供应商可以通过贸易信贷和损失分担来提高零售商的效用和自身利润。