Most unicellular organisms live in communities and express different phenotypes. Many efforts have been made to study the population dynamics of such complex communities of cells, coexisting as well-coordinated units. Minimal models based on ordinary differential equations are powerful tools that can help us understand complex phenomena. They represent an appropriate compromise between complexity and tractability; they allow a profound and comprehensive analysis, which is still easy to understand. Evolutionary game theory is another powerful tool that can help us understand the costs and benefits of the decision a particular cell of a unicellular social organism takes when faced with the challenges of the biotic and abiotic environment. This work is a binocular view at the population dynamics of such a community through the objectives of minimal modelling and evolutionary game theory. We test the behaviour of the community of a unicellular social organism at three levels of antibiotic stress. Even in the absence of the antibiotic, spikes in the fraction of resistant cells can be observed indicating the importance of bet hedging. At moderate level of antibiotic stress, we witness cyclic dynamics reminiscent of the renowned rock–paper–scissors game. At a very high level, the resistant type of strategy is the most favourable.

大多数单细胞生物生活在群落中并表现出不同的表型。已经做出了许多努力来研究这种复杂的细胞群落的种群动态，它们作为协调良好的单元共存。基于常微分方程的极小模型是帮助我们理解复杂现象的有力工具。它们代表了复杂性和易处理性之间的适当折衷；它们允许进行深刻而全面的分析，这仍然很容易理解。进化博弈论是另一个强大的工具，可以帮助我们了解单细胞社会有机体的特定细胞在面临生物和非生物环境挑战时做出的决定的成本和收益。这项工作是通过最小建模和进化博弈论的目标对此类社区的人口动态的双目观察。我们在三个抗生素应激水平下测试了单细胞社会生物群落的行为。即使在没有抗生素的情况下，也可以观察到耐药细胞比例的峰值，这表明赌注对冲的重要性。在中等水平的抗生素压力下，我们见证了循环动力学，让人想起著名的石头剪刀布游戏。在非常高的水平上，抵抗型策略是最有利的。可以观察到抗性细胞分数的峰值，表明投注对冲的重要性。在中等水平的抗生素压力下，我们见证了循环动力学，让人想起著名的石头剪刀布游戏。在非常高的水平上，抵抗型策略是最有利的。可以观察到抗性细胞比例的峰值，表明投注对冲的重要性。在中等水平的抗生素压力下，我们见证了循环动力学，让人想起著名的石头剪刀布游戏。在非常高的水平上，抵抗型策略是最有利的。