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Signalling boosts the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions
Journal of The Royal Society Interface ( IF 3.9 ) Pub Date : 2020-11-01 , DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2020.0635
Luis A Martinez-Vaquero 1 , Francisco C Santos 2 , Vito Trianni 1
Affiliation  

Many biological and social systems show significant levels of collective action. Several cooperation mechanisms have been proposed, yet they have been mostly studied independently. Among these, direct reciprocity supports cooperation on the basis of repeated interactions among individuals. Signals and quorum dynamics may also drive cooperation. Here, we resort to an evolutionary game-theoretical model to jointly analyse these two mechanisms and study the conditions in which evolution selects for direct reciprocity, signalling, or their combination. We show that signalling alone leads to higher levels of cooperation than when combined with reciprocity, while offering additional robustness against errors. Specifically, successful strategies in the realm of direct reciprocity are often not selected in the presence of signalling, and memory of past interactions is only exploited opportunistically in the case of earlier coordination failure. Differently, signalling always evolves, even when costly. In the light of these results, it may be easier to understand why direct reciprocity has been observed only in a limited number of cases among non-humans, whereas signalling is widespread at all levels of complexity.

中文翻译:

信号传递促进了重复群体互动中合作的演变

许多生物和社会系统表现出显着的集体行动水平。已经提出了几种合作机制,但它们大多是独立研究的。其中,直接互惠支持基于个体之间反复互动的合作。信号和群体动态也可能推动合作。在这里,我们采用进化博弈论模型来共同分析这两种机制,并研究进化选择直接互惠、信号传递或其组合的条件。我们表明,与互惠相结合相比,单独发出信号会带来更高水平的合作,同时提供额外的针对错误的鲁棒性。具体来说,在存在信号的情况下,通常不会选择直接互惠领域的成功策略,并且只有在早期协调失败的情况下才会机会主义地利用过去互动的记忆。不同的是,信号总是在不断发展,即使代价高昂。根据这些结果,可能更容易理解为什么仅在非人类的有限案例中观察到直接互惠,而信号传导在所有复杂程度中都广泛存在。
更新日期:2020-11-01
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