Improving the efficiency of subsidy policy to better promote R&D investment in new energy vehicles (NEVs) is of great strategic importance for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving sustainable development. Using the technology adoption life cycle theory, this paper proposes a tri-level programming model among a government, a NEVs manufacturer and customers to investigate the NEVs manufacturer's R&D investment strategies, the government's purchase subsidy policies, and customers' purchasing decisions. Through theoretical and numerical analysis, it is found that when the manufacturer is to maximize the sales, it commits R&D investment which maximizes sales of NEVs, or its entire R&D investment capital. When the manufacturer is to maximize its profit, it commits R&D investment which maximizes its profit, or makes the sales constraint satisfied. Purchase subsidy can raise the sales of NEVs, but cannot increase manufacturer's R&D investment, or even have a crowding-out effect on its R&D investment. These findings will help government improve the efficiency of purchase subsidy to better support the development of the NEVs industry.

中文翻译：

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根据技术采用生命周期和客户选择行为，对具有购买补贴的新能源汽车进行研发投资

提高补贴政策的效率，以更好地促进对新能源汽车的研发投资，对于减少温室气体排放和实现可持续发展具有重要的战略意义。本文采用技术采用生命周期理论，提出了政府，新能源汽车制造商和客户之间的三级程序设计模型，以研究新能源汽车制造商的研发投资策略，政府的购买补贴政策以及客户的购买决策。通过理论和数值分析发现，当制造商要实现最大销售额时，它会进行研发投资，从而使NEV的销售额或全部研发投资资本最大化。当制造商要最大化其利润时，它会进行研发投资以最大化其利润，或使销售约束得到满足。购买补贴可以提高新能源汽车的销量，但不能增加制造商的研发投资，甚至不能对其制造投资产生挤出效应。这些发现将有助于政府提高购买补贴的效率，从而更好地支持新能源汽车产业的发展。