This study investigates congestion pricing and capacity investment for an international network linking two countries’ airports and airlines. Under a Bertrand-Nash supposition for airports and Cournot competition for airlines in a duopoly, we characterize the locally optimal pricing rules for uniform and discriminatory charges levied by each country's airport. We clarify that the locally optimal pricing rules include a significant component resulting from the incentive to exploit the foreign airline, which is not included in the optimal pricing rules set by a social/global welfare-maximizing authority. We evaluate the pricing rules of the two airport charges for a round trip (i.e., the sum of each airport's per-departing-passenger charge). We clarify that the incentive to exploit the foreign airline is, theoretically, the only source of deviation from global welfare maximization (which may reach the first-best outcome) regardless of the uniform or discriminatory charges’ pricing regimes. Furthermore, we show that each airport's runway capacity investment could be globally efficient under globally optimal pricing rules, whereas each airport tends to overinvest under locally optimal pricing rules.

这项研究调查了连接两个国家的机场和航空公司的国际网络的拥堵定价和容量投资。根据对机场的Bertrand-Nash假设和针对双头垄断的航空公司的Cournot竞争，我们描述了每个国家机场收取的统一和歧视性收费的本地最优定价规则。我们明确指出，本地最优定价规则包括激励外国航空公司发展的重要组成部分，但不包括在由社会/全球福利最大化机构制定的最优定价规则中。我们评估往返两个机场费用的定价规则（即每个机场每位旅客的费用之和）。我们澄清说，从理论上讲，开发外国航空公司的动机是 不论统一收费或歧视性收费的定价方式如何，都是偏离全球福利最大化（可能达到最佳结果）的唯一来源。此外，我们表明，在全球最优定价规则下，每个机场的跑道容量投资可能具有全球效率，而在本地最优定价规则下，每个机场都倾向于过度投资。