Abstract We measure the eco-efficiency (EE) of agricultural production in regard to soil erosion and decompose it into technical efficiency (TE) and soil conservation efficiency (SCE). Data Envelopment Analysis is applied to a panel of 135 Austrian crop farms. As a proxy for soil conservation behavior, we estimate C- and P-factors, frequently applied in Revised Universal Soil Loss Equations, at the parcel-level and combine this with farm-level accountancy data. We investigate the impact of land tenure and other determinants on EE and its components using truncated regression and bootstrapping techniques. Results reveal that: i) the average EE, SCE, and TE is 0.16, 0.26, and 0.54, respectively, suggesting a substantial improvement potential in the soil conservation behavior of farms; ii) tenants have, on average, a significantly higher TE than landowners, but a significantly lower SCE; iii) the effect of tenancy on EE is significantly negative. Results point towards tenants maximizing short-term economic benefits leading to the overexploitation of soils. Results ask for regulations that increase the duration and security of rental contracts, and a shift in agricultural subsidies from direct payments based on area to compensations that provide public goods and internalize externalities.

中文翻译：

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土地使用权、土壤保持和农场绩效：奥地利农作物农场的生态效率分析

摘要 我们衡量农业生产在土壤侵蚀方面的生态效率（EE），并将其分解为技术效率（TE）和土壤保持效率（SCE）。数据包络分析应用于 135 个奥地利农作物农场的面板。作为土壤保持行为的代表，我们估计了 C 和 P 因子，在修订后的通用土壤流失方程中经常应用，在地块级别，并将其与农场级别的会计数据相结合。我们使用截断回归和引导技术研究土地所有权和其他决定因素对 EE 及其组成部分的影响。结果表明：i) 平均 EE、SCE 和 TE 分别为 0.16、0.26 和 0.54，表明农场的土壤保持行为具有显着的改善潜力；ii) 租户平均而言，TE 明显高于土地所有者，但 SCE 明显较低；iii) 租赁对 EE 的影响是显着的负面影响。结果表明租户将短期经济效益最大化，从而导致土壤过度开发。结果要求制定增加租赁合同期限和安全性的法规，并将农业补贴从基于面积的直接支付转变为提供公共产品和内部化外部性的补偿。