In a competitive environment, determining when to enter the market and what homing policies should be adopted are crucial strategic decisions for platform-based businesses. In this study, we investigate the interactions between two platforms competing in two-sided markets with cross-sided network effects and determine their prices under different entry and homing strategies. We derive the equilibrium demands of two-sided markets for platforms and the equilibrium prices for two competing platforms. We further conduct a comparative analysis among scenarios with different combinations of homing and entry strategies. We find that early-entry platforms will preserve high margins in large early markets, where fierce price competition occurs once their rivals enter these markets. However, early entry is not always beneficial for platforms because the market-cannibalization effect emerges in the subsequent period. Furthermore, this effect will be amplified by the platforms' homing and entry strategies. In addition, cross-sided network effects lead buyers, sellers, and platforms to prefer a multi-homing policy, which is beneficial for society as a whole. Managerial insights are also provided for platform-based businesses.

在竞争激烈的环境中，确定何时进入市场以及应采用哪种归位策略是基于平台的企业的关键战略决策。在这项研究中，我们调查了在具有双向网络效应的双向市场中竞争的两个平台之间的相互作用，并确定了在不同进入和归巢策略下的价格。我们推导出了平台两侧市场的均衡需求和两个竞争平台的均衡价格。我们还将对具有不同归位和进入策略组合的场景进行比较分析。我们发现，早期进入的平台将在大型早期市场中保持较高的利润率，一旦竞争对手进入这些市场，在那里就会出现激烈的价格竞争。然而，早期进入并不总是对平台有利，因为市场蚕食效应在随后的时期出现。此外，平台的归位和进入策略会放大这种影响。此外，多面网络效应使买方，卖方和平台倾向于采用多宿主策略，这对整个社会都有利。还为基于平台的企业提供管理洞察力。