This paper examines how a commitment to a common tax on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions affects spatial distribution of production and welfare between countries. To focus on the long‐term effects of firm relocation, the paper employs a two‐country model of monopolistic competition with a variable abatement technology. In the model, the elasticity of substitution between GHG emissions and the conventional input is a key parameter. If the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one (in the substitutable area), the relative number of firms and the relative welfare in the large country monotonically increase with uniform tax rates. Meanwhile, if the elasticity of substitution is larger than one, they both follow inverted U‐shaped curves in response to tax rates. Nevertheless, for any level of taxes, they both are necessarily higher than those in the case without taxes. This suggests that uniform emission taxes widen international disparities of firm location and welfare.

中文翻译：

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统一的排放税，减排和空间差异

本文研究了对温室气体（GHG）排放征收共同税的承诺如何影响国家之间生产和福利的空间分布。为了关注公司搬迁的长期影响，本文采用可变减排技术的两个国家的垄断竞争模型。在该模型中，温室气体排放量与常规输入之间的替代弹性是关键参数。如果替代弹性小于一个（在可替代区域内），则大国的公司相对数量和相对福利会随着统一税率而单调增加。同时，如果替代弹性大于1，则它们都将遵循反U形曲线以响应税率。不过，无论征税多少，它们两者都必然比没有税的情况更高。这表明统一的排放税扩大了企业所在地和福利的国际差距。