Abstract We present an economic model of a market for wildlife products. We use it to study theoretically the potential impact on the poaching of wildlife animals if a legal market for synthetic wildlife products is created. We show that allowing for a legal trade in synthetic substitutes in general has two opposing effects on poaching level: a price effect that reduces poaching by lowering the revenue generated from poaching; and a laundering effect that encourages poaching by making it easier for poachers to sell their products. When demand for wildlife goods is inelastic, the price effect is bigger, while the laundering effect is smaller; hence, establishing a legal market for synthetic substitutes is more likely to reduce poaching when demand is less sensitive to price changes. Measures that make it more difficult for poachers to launder their products reduce the laundering effect and enhance the conservation value of producing synthetic substitutes.

中文翻译：

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一种简单的合成野生动物制品销售许可制度的理论分析

摘要 我们提出了一个野生动物产品市场的经济模型。如果合成野生动物产品的合法市场建立，我们将使用它从理论上研究对野生动物偷猎的潜在影响。我们表明，允许合成替代品的合法交易通常对偷猎水平有两个相反的影响：价格效应通过降低偷猎产生的收入来减少偷猎；以及通过使偷猎者更容易销售他们的产品来鼓励偷猎的洗钱效应。当对野生动物商品的需求缺乏弹性时，价格效应较大，而洗钱效应较小；因此，当需求对价格变化不太敏感时，建立合成替代品的合法市场更有可能减少偷猎。