This work develops a general model of a two-echelon supply chain in which a dominant retailer interacts with a manufacturer via a consignment contract with revenue sharing. The manufacturer’s cost function is known only to him, whereas the retailer has only an estimation of this function, which is based on common knowledge. We formulate the interaction between the parties as a Stackelberg game in which the less informed party (the retailer) moves first. We investigate a strategic information-sharing policy of the manufacturer under general formulations of (i) the supply chain’s revenue and cost functions, and (ii) the manufacturer’s decision functions. Two models are considered: (i) a point-estimation model—the retailer relies on a single-valued estimation of the manufacturer’s cost function, based on her “best belief”; and (ii) an interval-estimation model—the retailer faces uncertainty with regard to the cost function and thus estimates its parameter values within intervals. We find a condition that distinguishes between a case in which it is optimal for both parties for the manufacturer to share his exact cost function and a case in which such information-sharing is not optimal for the manufacturer but is optimal for the retailer. In the interval-estimation model, equilibrium is obtained using a normative (probabilistic) approach as well as behavioral-decision criteria (max–max, max–min and regret minimization). Under a normative approach both hidden and known superiority of the manufacturer are considered. Finally, we use our model to analyze a supply chain of a mobile application.

中文翻译：

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收入共享的寄售合同下在线零售的战略信息共享

这项工作开发了一个两梯队供应链的一般模型，在该模型中，占主导地位的零售商通过带有收入共享的寄售合同与制造商进行互动。制造商的成本函数只有他自己知道，而零售商只有这个函数的估计，这是基于常识。我们将各方之间的互动表述为 Stackelberg 博弈，其中信息较少的一方（零售商）先行动。我们在 (i) 供应链的收入和成本函数和 (ii) 制造商的决策函数的一般公式下调查制造商的战略信息共享政策。考虑了两种模型： (i) 点估计模型——零售商依赖于制造商成本函数的单值估计，基于她的“最佳信念”；(ii) 区间估计模型——零售商面临成本函数的不确定性，因此在区间内估计其参数值。我们找到了一种条件，可以区分制造商共享他的确切成本函数对双方来说是最佳的情况，以及这种信息共享对制造商来说不是最佳但对零售商来说是最佳的情况。在区间估计模型中，平衡是使用规范（概率）方法以及行为决策标准（最大-最大、最大-最小和后悔最小化）获得的。在规范方法下，制造商的隐藏和已知优势都被考虑在内。最后，我们使用我们的模型来分析移动应用程序的供应链。