ABSTRACT The computational metaphor of organisms as phenotypic automata controlled by a genetic programme has been replaced by the cognitive metaphor of organisms as intelligent agents making decisions about how to use their genomic and environmental resources. This metaphor facilitates novel ways of thinking about organisms that defy the assumptions of the old machine metaphor. But like all metaphors, the cognitive metaphor discloses important similarities at the expense of eclipsing significant dissimilarities. I argue that although cognitivism carries with it the crucial insight that living organisms are agents rather than mere automata, this metaphor distorts the nature of biological agency by over-intellectualizing, which risks eliminating the distinction between life and mind. I trace the Cartesian root of these metaphors and argue that it generates a dilemma between mechanism and intellectualism. To capture the middle path that most organisms occupy between these two extremes, I propose an ecological account of natural agency.

中文翻译：

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生物心理学：计算与认知之间的生活

摘要 生物体作为由遗传程序控制的表型自动机的计算隐喻已经被生物体作为智能代理的认知隐喻所取代，该隐喻是决定如何使用其基因组和环境资源的决策者。这个比喻促进了对有机体的新颖思考方式，这些方式违反了旧机器比喻的假设。但与所有隐喻一样，认知隐喻以消除显着差异为代价，揭示了重要的相似之处。我认为，尽管认知主义带有重要的洞察力，即生物体是代理而不仅仅是自动机，但这个比喻通过过度智力化扭曲了生物能动性的本质，这有可能消除生命和心灵之间的区别。我追溯了这些隐喻的笛卡尔根源，并认为它在机制和理智主义之间产生了两难境地。为了捕捉大多数生物体在这两个极端之间占据的中间路径，我提出了自然能动性的生态学解释。