Abstract By delegating path control to end-hosts, future Internet architectures offer flexibility for path selection. However, there is a concern that the distributed routing decisions by end-hosts, in particular load-adaptive routing, can lead to oscillations if path selection is performed without coordination or accurate load information. Prior research has addressed this problem by devising path-selection policies that lead to stability. However, little is known about the viability of these policies in the Internet context, where selfish end-hosts can deviate from a prescribed policy if such a deviation is beneficial from their individual perspective. In order to achieve network stability in future Internet architectures, it is essential that end-hosts have an incentive to adopt a stability-oriented path-selection policy. In this work, we perform the first incentive analysis of the stability-inducing path-selection policies proposed in the literature. Building on a game-theoretic model of end-host path selection, we show that these policies are in fact incompatible with the self-interest of end-hosts, as these strategies make it worthwhile to pursue an oscillatory path-selection strategy. Therefore, stability in networks with selfish end-hosts must be enforced by incentive-compatible mechanisms. We present two such mechanisms and formally prove their incentive compatibility.

中文翻译：

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激励未来互联网架构中的稳定路径选择

摘要 通过将路径控制委托给终端主机，未来的互联网架构为路径选择提供了灵活性。然而，如果在没有协调或准确负载信息的情况下执行路径选择，则终端主机的分布式路由决策，特别是负载自适应路由，可能会导致振荡。先前的研究通过设计导致稳定性的路径选择政策来解决这个问题。然而，对于这些政策在互联网环境中的可行性知之甚少，如果这种偏离对他们个人有利，自私的终端主机可以偏离规定的政策。为了在未来的互联网架构中实现网络稳定性，终端主机必须有动力采用面向稳定性的路径选择策略。在这项工作中，我们对文献中提出的稳定诱导路径选择政策进行了第一次激励分析。基于端主机路径选择的博弈论模型，我们表明这些策略实际上与端主机的自身利益不相容，因为这些策略使得追求振荡路径选择策略是值得的。因此，必须通过激励兼容机制来确保具有自私终端主机的网络的稳定性。我们提出了两种这样的机制，并正式证明了它们的激励兼容性。因为这些策略使得采用振荡路径选择策略是值得的。因此，必须通过激励兼容机制来确保具有自私终端主机的网络的稳定性。我们提出了两种这样的机制，并正式证明了它们的激励兼容性。因为这些策略使得采用振荡路径选择策略是值得的。因此，必须通过激励兼容机制来确保具有自私终端主机的网络的稳定性。我们提出了两种这样的机制，并正式证明了它们的激励兼容性。