In this paper, we study the optimal ordering and inventory reallocation of the inventory service platform under the retailer demand information sharing. Due to the uncertainty of market demand, retailers’ demand information is likely to be inaccurate or even false. In this regard, retailers can reduce demand uncertainty by screening market signals. Therefore, based on the sharing of mean demand information and market signals, we explored the platform’s optimal ordering and inventory reallocation strategies, analyzed the retailer’s motivation for sharing false demand information, and proposed a corresponding penalty coordination mechanism. Our results show that the sharing of demand information and screening market signals reduces the uncertainty of market demand, thereby improving the accuracy of orders and increasing profit of the system. On the other hand, we find that the inventory reallocation strategy of the platform is affected by uncertain market information, but has nothing to do with the actual average demand and market signals shared by retailers. In this way, retailers will only share real information when the sharing system meets certain key conditions, otherwise they may share false demand information. The proposed punishment mechanism can encourage retailers to share their actual demand information with the platform.

本文研究了零售商需求信息共享下库存服务平台的最优订货与库存再分配。由于市场需求的不确定性，零售商的需求信息可能不准确甚至是虚假的。在这方面，零售商可以通过筛选市场信号来减少需求不确定性。因此，在共享平均需求信息和市场信号的基础上，我们探索了该平台的最佳订购和库存重新分配策略，分析了零售商共享虚假需求信息的动机，并提出了相应的罚款协调机制。我们的结果表明，共享需求信息和筛选市场信号减少了市场需求的不确定性，从而提高了订单的准确性并增加了系统的利润。另一方面，我们发现该平台的库存重新分配策略受不确定的市场信息的影响，但与零售商共享的实际平均需求和市场信号无关。这样，零售商仅在共享系统满足某些关键条件时才共享真实信息，否则它们可能共享虚假的需求信息。拟议的惩罚机制可以鼓励零售商与平台共享其实际需求信息。否则，他们可能会共享虚假的需求信息。拟议的惩罚机制可以鼓励零售商与平台共享其实际需求信息。否则，他们可能会共享虚假的需求信息。拟议的惩罚机制可以鼓励零售商与平台共享其实际需求信息。