I analyze the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. The same method can be used to fully characterize the limit set of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of any the finitely repeated game.

中文翻译：

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有限重复博弈的完整民间定理

我分析了具有完全信息和完美监控的任何有限重复博弈的纯策略子博弈完美纳什均衡集。主要结果是随着时间范围的增加，有限重复博弈的纯策略子博弈完美纳什均衡收益向量集的极限集的完整表征。可以使用相同的方法来完全刻画任何有限重复博弈的纯策略纳什均衡收益向量集的极限集。