In this paper, a dynamic rent-seeking game incorporating policymaker cost and competition intensity is considered. On the basis of the political environment and rent-seekers with incomplete information set, the locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is proved. The competition intensity and policymaker cost could enlarge the stability region of Nash equilibrium. The higher the competition intensity is, the more the opponent’s expenditure reduces the player’s success probability, which is beneficial to the maintenance of Nash equilibrium. The higher the policymaker cost is, the less easily both players succeed and the more stable the rent-seeking market is. As the competition parameter decreases or the expenditure parameter increases, there will be chaos in a rent-seeking market. Chaos control is in order to stabilize the equilibrium of the rent-seeking game.

中文翻译：

---

具有决策者成本和竞争强度的动态寻租游戏

本文考虑了一种动态的寻租博弈，它包含了决策者的成本和竞争强度。在不完整信息集的政治环境和寻租者的基础上，证明了纳什均衡的局部渐近稳定性。竞争强度和决策者成本可以扩大纳什均衡的稳定范围。竞争强度越高，对手的支出越会减少玩家的成功概率，这有利于维持纳什均衡。决策者的成本越高，参与者越不容易成功，寻租市场越稳定。随着竞争参数的减少或支出参数的增加，寻租市场将出现混乱。