This paper studies an extension of Naor’s model in which there is parameter uncertainty. In particular, the arrival rate is known, to customers and system managers, only through its distribution. For the observable case, the relationship between the optimal individual threshold and the thresholds for a social optimizer or revenue maximizer does not change from the classical model with a known arrival rate. However, in the unobservable case, it is shown that the decisions of the social optimizer and revenue maximizer no longer coincide. Furthermore, in the unobservable case with arrival rate uncertainty, the social optimizer induces a lower expected arrival rate than the revenue maximizer. This stands in contrast to the observable case, in which the social optimizer prefers a more congested system.

中文翻译：

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知识、拥堵和经济：Naor 模型中的参数不确定性

本文研究了存在参数不确定性的 Naor 模型的扩展。特别是，到达率对于客户和系统管理员来说，只有通过它的分布才能知道。对于可观察的情况，最佳个体阈值与社会优化器或收入最大化器的阈值之间的关系与具有已知到达率的经典模型没有变化。然而，在不可观察的情况下，社会优化者和收入最大化者的决策不再重合。此外，在到达率不确定的不可观察情况下，社会优化器比收入最大化器产生更低的预期到达率。这与可观察的情况形成对比，在这种情况下，社交优化器更喜欢更拥挤的系统。