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A Formally Verified Protocol for Log Replication with Byzantine Fault Tolerance
arXiv - CS - Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing Pub Date : 2020-09-22 , DOI: arxiv-2009.10664
Joel Wanner and Laurent Chuat and Adrian Perrig

Byzantine fault tolerant protocols enable state replication in the presence of crashed, malfunctioning, or actively malicious processes. Designing such protocols without the assistance of verification tools, however, is remarkably error-prone. In an adversarial environment, performance and flexibility come at the cost of complexity, making the verification of existing protocols extremely difficult. We take a different approach and propose a formally verified consensus protocol designed for a specific use case: secure logging. Our protocol allows each node to propose entries in a parallel subroutine, and guarantees that correct nodes agree on the set of all proposed entries, without leader election. It is simple yet practical, as it can accommodate the workload of a logging system such as Certificate Transparency. We show that it is optimal in terms of both required rounds and tolerable faults. Using Isabelle/HOL, we provide a fully machine-checked security proof based upon the Heard-Of model, which we extend to support signatures. We also present and evaluate a prototype implementation.

中文翻译:

一种经过形式验证的具有拜占庭容错的日志复制协议

拜占庭容错协议在出现崩溃、故障或恶意进程的情况下启用状态复制。然而,在没有验证工具帮助的情况下设计此类协议非常容易出错。在对抗性环境中,性能和灵活性是以复杂性为代价的,这使得现有协议的验证变得极其困难。我们采用了一种不同的方法,并提出了一种为特定用例设计的经过正式验证的共识协议:安全​​日志记录。我们的协议允许每个节点在并行子程序中提议条目,并保证正确的节点就所有提议条目的集合达成一致,而无需选举领导者。它简单而实用,因为它可以适应诸如证书透明度之类的日志记录系统的工作负载。我们表明,它在所需的轮次和可容忍的错误方面都是最佳的。使用 Isabelle/HOL,我们提供了基于 Heard-Of 模型的完全机器检查的安全证明,我们将其扩展为支持签名。我们还展示并评估了一个原型实现。
更新日期:2020-09-23
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