The interaction between nurses and their managers is a very important factor in nurses’ error reporting behaviour, which is crucial to improving patient safety in healthcare organizations. However, little theoretical work has been undertaken to analyse this interaction. This paper uses a game-theoretic principal–agent framework with asymmetric information to study this interaction. We suppose that the principal (the nurse manager) asks the agent (the nurse) to perform a task with a certain patient. In case a mistake is made while treating the patient, the nurse has to decide whether to report it to the manager, who can observe whether the patient suffered an accident. We consider different manager’s leadership styles and analyse their performance in obtaining error notification from nurses in this framework.

中文翻译：

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错误报告和护理管理绩效：博弈论研究

护士及其管理人员之间的互动是护士错误报告行为的一个非常重要的因素，这对于提高医疗机构的患者安全至关重要。但是，很少有理论工作来分析这种相互作用。本文使用具有不对称信息的博弈论委托代理框架来研究这种相互作用。我们假设委托人（护士经理）要求代理人（护士）对某个患者执行任务。如果在治疗患者时出错，则护士必须决定是否将其报告给经理，经理可以观察患者是否发生了事故。在此框架中，我们考虑了不同经理的领导风格，并分析了他们在从护士那里获取错误通知时的表现。