Abstract This paper presents a model for housing markets with interdependent values. We introduce private information on the quality of a house (i.e., high or low), which is known only to the initial owner. Interdependency means that the ex-post preference of an agent depends on the private information of the other agents with regard to the quality of houses. We prove that on a domain satisfying a richness condition, the no-trade rule is the only rule that satisfies ex-post incentive compatibility and ex-post individual rationality.

中文翻译：

---

具有相互依存价值的住房市场中的事后激励相容和个体合理分配

摘要 本文提出了一个具有相互依存价值的住房市场模型。我们介绍有关房屋质量（即高或低）的私人信息，这些信息只有最初的所有者才知道。相互依赖意味着一个代理人的事后偏好取决于其他代理人关于房屋质量的私人信息。我们证明了在满足丰富性条件的域上，无交易规则是唯一满足事后激励相容和事后个体理性的规则。