当前位置: X-MOL 学术Int. J. Game Theory › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment
International Journal of Game Theory ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2019-06-28 , DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00678-0
Oliver Kirchkamp , J. Philipp Reiß

Abstract We present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding in first-price auctions. We investigate the extent to which the amount of underbidding depends on the seemingly innocuous parameters of the experimental setup. To structure our data, we present and test a theory that introduces constant markdown bidders into a population of fully rational bidders. While a fraction of bidders in the experiment can be described by Bayesian Nash equilibrium bids, a larger fraction seems either to use constant markdown bids or to rationally optimise against a population with fully rational and boundedly rational markdown bidders.

中文翻译:

理性和有限理性竞标者拍卖中的异质竞标:理论与实验

摘要 我们展示了一系列实验的结果,这些实验使我们能够衡量出价过高,特别是第一价格拍卖中的出价过低。我们调查了出价不足的程度取决于实验设置的看似无害的参数。为了构建我们的数据,我们提出并测试了一种理论,该理论将不断降价的投标人引入到一群完全理性的投标人中。虽然实验中的一小部分投标人可以用贝叶斯纳什均衡投标来描述,但更大的一部分似乎要么使用不变的降价投标,要么针对具有完全理性和有限理性降价投标人的群体进行理性优化。
更新日期:2019-06-28
down
wechat
bug