The increasing integration of renewable energy has highlighted the importance of interchange trading in multi-area power systems (MAPS). In some existing multi-area electricity markets, the marginal-pricing (MP) mechanism is adopted. However, this mechanism is known to lose market efficiency when profit-maximizing units strategically bid to manipulate electricity prices. To elicit truthful bids from generators and guarantee the optimality of MAPS, we propose an incentive mechanism based on Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. A two-stage multi-area economic dispatch model for joint energy and reserve clearing is formulated with hybrid AC/DC links. We illustrate that when settled by the MP mechanism, thermal units have incentive to strategically bid on reserve prices, thereby preventing inter-area power exchange. The VCG-based mechanism sets up the payment to a unit as other generators’ incremental costs after removing it in the market clearing process, which reveals the externality induced by this unit and thus incentivizes truthful bids. To preserve each area's autonomy, a novel decentralized algorithm based on improved optimality condition decomposition is developed. Case studies based on a 2-area 60-bus system and a 3-area 354-bus system demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed mechanism and method.

中文翻译：

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清理多区域电力系统中的能源和储备市场的激励机制

可再生能源的日益融合突显了多区域电力系统（MAPS）中交换交易的重要性。在一些现有的多区域电力市场中，采用边际定价（MP）机制。但是，当利润最大化的单位战略性地试图操纵电价时，这种机制就会失去市场效率。为了从发电机中获得真实的报价并保证MAPS的最优性，我们提出了一种基于Vickrey-Clarke-Groves（VCG）拍卖的激励机制。利用交流/直流混合链路，建立了用于联合能源和储备清算的两阶段多区域经济调度模型。我们举例说明，通过MP机制解决后，热力单位就有动力对储备价格进行战略性竞标，从而阻止区域间电力交换。基于VCG的机制在市场清算过程中将其支付后，将其支付给其他产生者的增量成本设置为单位，这揭示了该单元引起的外部性，从而激励了真实的投标。为了保留每个区域的自治权，开发了一种基于改进的最优性条件分解的新型分散算法。基于2区域60总线系统和3区域354总线系统的案例研究证明了所提出的机制和方法的有效性和效率。