This paper presents equilibrium and social customer behavior in a single-server queueing system with Bernoulli-schedule-controlled vacation and vacation interruption. An arriving customer takes the decision whether to join the system or balk according to an observation of the system length and the status of the server, which is more reasonable than the classical point of view that the decisions are induced by the servers and the customers are compelled to follow them. Four cases with respect to several levels of information and the corresponding Nash equilibria are discussed. The equilibrium strategies and stationary system behavior are studied for both observable and unobservable cases using the reward-cost structure of the system. We show the impact of the information level as well as several parameters on the equilibrium thresholds and social benefits through numerical results. The research outcomes might provide the managers with reference information on the pricing problem in the queueing system and will help the customers to take optimal threshold strategies.

本文提出了在具有Bernoulli计划控制的休假和休假中断的单服务器排队系统中的均衡和社会顾客行为。到达的客户根据对系统长度和服务器状态的观察来决定是要加入系统还是拒绝系统，这比经典的观点认为决策是由服务器引起的，并且客户是被迫跟随他们。讨论了有关几个信息级别和相应纳什均衡的四种情况。使用系统的奖励成本结构研究了可观察和不可观察情况下的平衡策略和平稳系统行为。我们通过数值结果显示了信息水平以及几个参数对均衡阈值和社会效益的影响。研究结果可能为管理者提供有关排队系统中定价问题的参考信息，并将帮助客户采取最佳的门槛策略。