In the climate ethics debate, scholars largely agree that individuals should promote institutions that ensure the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This paper aims to establish that there are individual duties beyond compliance with and promotion of institutions. Duties of individuals to reduce their emissions are often objected to by arguing that an individual’s emissions do not make a morally relevant difference. We challenge this argument from inconsequentialism in two ways. We first show why the argument also seems to undermine the case for duties to promote institutions that the arguments’ proponents endorse. Second, we argue that individuals ought to cut emissions if they exceed their fair share of emissions entitlements and, by emitting, contribute to climate-related harm. In response to inconsequentialism, we specify the notion of ‘contribution’ via the so-called NESS theory, according to which an act is causally relevant for and contributes to an outcome if it is a Necessary Element of a Set of conditions that is Sufficient for the outcome. After refuting two objections to our approach, we conclude by discussing how to deal with possible conflicts between duties to promote institutions and to reduce one’s emissions.

中文翻译：

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个人对有害气候变化的贡献：重申公平的Shιιare 论点

在气候伦理辩论中，学者们大多同意个人应该促进确保减少温室气体排放的机构。本文旨在确定除了遵守和促进机构之外还有个人职责。个人减少排放的义务经常遭到反对，因为他们认为个人的排放不会产生道德相关的差异。我们以两种方式对无关紧要主义的这一论点提出质疑。我们首先说明为什么该论点似乎也削弱了促进该论点支持者认可的制度的义务的理由。其次，我们认为，如果个人超出其公平份额的排放权，并且通过排放导致与气候相关的危害，则他们应该减少排放。为了回应无意义主义，我们通过所谓的 NESS 理论详细说明了“贡献”的概念，根据该理论，如果一个行为是一组足以产生结果的条件的必要元素，那么它就与结果有因果关系并有助于结果。在驳斥了对我们的方法的两个反对意见之后，我们最后讨论了如何处理促进机构和减少排放的职责之间可能存在的冲突。