According to a common view, animals have moral status. Further, a standard defense of this view is the Argument from Consciousness: animals have moral status because they are conscious and can experience pain and it would be bad were they to experience pain. In a series of papers (J Agric Environ Ethics 28(2):277–291, 2015a, J Agric Environ Ethics 28(11):11270–1138, 2015b, J Agric Environ Ethics 30(1):37–54, 2017), Timothy Hsiao claims that animals do not have moral status and criticizes the Argument from Consciousness. This short paper defends the Argument from Consciousness by providing two simple responses to Hsiao’s criticism.

中文翻译：

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萧对动物的道德状况：两个简单的回应

普遍认为，动物具有道德地位。此外，对这种观点的标准辩护是来自意识的论证：动物具有道德地位，因为它们有意识并且可以经历疼痛，如果它们经历疼痛将是糟糕的。在一系列论文中 (J Agric Environ Ethics 28(2):277-291, 2015a, J Agric Environ Ethics 28(11):11270-1138, 2015b, J Agric Environ Ethics 30(1):37-574, 201 ），Timothy Hsiao 声称动物没有道德地位，并批评“意识论证”。这篇简短的论文通过对萧的批评提供两个简单的回应来捍卫“意识论证”。