We analyze the authenticated encryption algorithm of ORANGE, a submission to the NIST lightweight cryptography standardization process. We show that it is practically possible to craft forgeries out of two observed transmitted messages that encrypt the same plaintext. The authors of ORANGE have confirmed the attack, and they discuss a fix for this attack in their second-round submission of ORANGE to the NIST lightweight cryptography competition.

中文翻译：

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实用的橙色伪造品

我们分析了已提交给NIST轻量级密码标准化过程的ORANGE的认证加密算法。我们表明，实际上有可能从两个观察到的加密相同明文的传输消息中伪造出伪造品。ORANGE的作者已经确认了这种攻击，他们在第二轮ORANGE提交给NIST轻量级密码竞赛的过程中讨论了此攻击的修复方法。