In metropolitan areas, taxicab regulation often has exclusive cruising regulations that prevent taxis affiliated with one jurisdiction from picking up passengers in another. When multiple cities are in close proximity, empty return trips occurring after taxis drive passengers from one jurisdiction to another results in inefficiency. This source of inefficiency can be eliminated by creating a combined affiliation and letting affiliated taxis pick up passengers in any jurisdiction. Under combined regulation, however, drivers may have an incentive to direct their search in a manner that leads to an allocation of taxis across locations that is not socially optimal. We develop a regulatory exchange market that maintains separate affiliations but provides drivers the ability to exchange the right to pick up passengers in each other's affiliated location. The regulatory exchange market is preferred to both exclusive cruising and combined regulation, and achieves the first-best in a large class of situations.

在大都市地区，出租车规章通常具有专门的巡航规章，以防止隶属于一个管辖区的出租车在另一个管辖区接载乘客。当附近有多个城市时，出租车将乘客从一个管辖区驱逐到另一个管辖区后，发生空回程，导致效率低下。这种低效率的根源可以通过建立联合隶属关系并让附属出租车在任何司法管辖区接载乘客来消除。但是，在联合法规的约束下，驾驶员可能有动力以某种方式引导他们的搜索，从而导致出租车在各个社会上都不是最理想的位置。我们开发了一个监管交易所市场，该市场拥有独立的隶属关系，但为驾驶员提供了交换权利以接载彼此的权利。的附属位置。监管交易所市场比独家监管和联合监管都更受青睐，并且在各种情况下均达到最佳。