This paper studies the behavior of the national air traffic control (ATC) centers in the EU as it relates to bargaining between a union and government. We analyze wage formation, the reactions of ATC's to a price-cap, the slow adoption of new technologies, the reluctance to vertically disintegrate, the slow standardization, and the failures of mergers of neighboring ATC's. The theory is illustrated by using estimated union preference parameters and bargaining power parameters for the government. We find that bargaining power and union preferences vary greatly by country.

中文翻译：

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欧洲有工会议价的航空交通管制法规¹

本文研究了欧盟国家空中交通管制（ATC）中心的行为，因为它与工会和政府之间的讨价还价有关。我们分析了工资形成，ATC对价格上限的反应，新技术的缓慢采用，不愿垂直解体，标准化缓慢以及相邻ATC合并失败的情况。通过使用估计的工会偏好参数和政府的议价能力参数来说明该理论。我们发现，议价能力和工会偏好因国家而异。