Following three generations of buyback contracts, the new model of Iranian petroleum contracts (IPC) was introduced by the Iranian cabinet to incentivize investments in the country. This paper analyzes the fiscal terms of the contract with technical information from one of the candidate fields for licensing. The financial simulation shows that, in general, the IPC resembles more a service contract than a production sharing contract as the contractor’s take is relatively low—below 5% across different scenarios of crude oil price. Second, the IPC is progressive in that as the overall profitability of the project improves the government takes an increasing share of the economic rent. The results are confirmed in a sensitivity analysis of each party’s profitability and takes on oil price, CAPEX, OPEX and the fee.

中文翻译：

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伊朗石油合同的经济分析

经过三代回购合同，伊朗内阁引入了新的伊朗石油合同（IPC）模式，以激励对该国的投资。本文使用来自许可的候选领域之一的技术信息来分析合同的财务条款。财务模拟显示，总体而言，由于承包商的收入相对较低（在不同的原油价格情况下低于5％），IPC更像是服务合同而不是生产分成合同。第二，IPC是进步的，因为随着项目的整体盈利能力的提高，政府在经济租金中所占的份额越来越大。在对各方利润率的敏感性分析中确认了该结果，并采用了油价，资本支出，运营支出和费用。