Abstract Imitation and innovation are the most common ways for people to learn and evolve. However, the combination of imitation and innovation not only inhibits the emergence of cooperation, but also leads to the fragmentation of cooperative clusters. In reality, cooperation exists widely in people's lives. This paper examines how cooperation is maintained in human interaction and what mechanism can eliminate the inhibition of heterogeneous strategy updating rules. To that end, we introduce a reputation mechanism into the traditional prisoner's dilemma model. In our version, the player's reputation is adapted dynamically, and fitness is determined by reputations and strategies. In addition, the players' strategy updating rules are divided into imitation and innovation. The results show that: under the heterogeneous strategy updating rules, the introduction of reputation is beneficial to the emergence of cooperation. Good reputation also enhances the capacity of cooperators to resist temptation. Our research provides insight into the role of reputation under heterogeneous strategy updating rules.

中文翻译：

---

基于声誉的适应度调整促进异构策略更新规则下的合作

摘要 模仿和创新是人们学习和进化最常见的方式。然而，模仿与创新的结合不仅抑制了合作的出现，而且导致了合作集群的碎片化。在现实中，合作广泛存在于人们的生活中。本文研究了在人际交互中如何保持合作以及什么机制可以消除异构策略更新规则的抑制。为此，我们在传统的囚徒困境模型中引入了声誉机制。在我们的版本中，玩家的声誉是动态调整的，适应度由声誉和策略决定。此外，玩家的策略更新规则分为模仿和创新。结果表明：在异构策略更新规则下，信誉的引入有利于合作的出现。良好的声誉也增强了合作者抗拒诱惑的能力。我们的研究深入了解了声誉在异构策略更新规则下的作用。