Environmental concerns and energy security issues have led to the rapid growth of renewable capacities in the power sector. With the increase in the penetration of renewables, conventional generations such as thermal technologies have faced the decreased market prices, reduced volume of sold energies and thus diminished revenues. The decrease in the interests for investment in conventional capacities resulting from revenue deficiency from one side and high penetration of non-dispatchable renewables such as wind and solar generations from the other side may hinder the generation adequacy. So, the investment in conventional and renewable capacities should be done in a coordinated manner to meet both adequacy and environmental goals. Thus, the present study is conducted to present a regulatory tool for coordinated incentive design of investment in conventional and renewable generation capacities considering market equilibria. To this aim, a bi-level model is proposed where in the first level, regulator determines capacity-based and energy-based incentives paid for conventional and renewable generations, respectively, considering targets for adequacy and environmental issues. In the second level, the investment behavior of generation companies in response to investment incentives is anticipated using a game-theoretic model. Our results show that regulatory targets for adequacy and environmental issues are simultaneously realized by the proposed coordinated incentive design. Besides, cost of the designed incentives considerably reduces compared to the recent works.

环境问题和能源安全问题已导致电力部门的可再生能源容量快速增长。随着可再生能源渗透率的提高，热电技术等传统发电技术面临着市场价格下降，售出能源量减少以及收入减少的问题。一方面，由于收入不足而另一方面，由于不可分配的可再生能源（例如风能和太阳能发电）的高渗透率，导致传统发电能力投资兴趣的下降，可能会阻碍发电的充足性。因此，对常规和可再生能源的投资应以协调的方式进行，以满足既有的环境目标。从而，进行本研究是为了提出一种监管工具，该工具考虑了市场均衡，对常规和可再生发电能力的投资进行了协调激励设计。为此，提出了一个两级模型，在第一级中，监管机构确定了针对常规和可再生能源发电的基于容量和基于能源的激励措施，同时考虑了充足性和环境问题的目标。在第二级中，使用博弈论模型预期发电公司响应投资激励的投资行为。我们的结果表明，通过提出的协调激励设计，可以同时实现充足性和环境问题的监管目标。此外，与最近的工作相比，设计的激励措施的成本大大降低了。