We consider a firm producing and selling experience products over two periods with private quality information. Consumers strategically decide their purchasing timing driven by the imitation effect, and the firm chooses pricing policy (dynamic or preannounced) and equilibrium type (separating or pooling, through which true quality information is revealed). Results imply that the firm prefers preannounced pricing but consumers prefer dynamic pricing. Under both pricing schemes, the first-period price decreases but the second-period price increases with the imitation effect. A pooling-pooling equilibrium is always preferred, unless the firm is farsighted and the imitation effect is weak under dynamic pricing.

我们考虑在两个时期内通过私人质量信息生产和销售体验产品的公司。消费者在模仿效果的驱动下从战略上决定他们的购买时机，企业选择定价策略（动态或预先宣布）和均衡类型（分离或合并，从而揭示真实的质量信息）。结果表明，该公司更喜欢预先宣布的价格，但消费者更喜欢动态价格。在这两种定价方案下，第一阶段的价格都会随着模仿效果而降低，而第二阶段的价格则会随着模仿效果而提高。除非有远见的公司并且在动态定价下模仿效果较弱，否则总是首选池池均衡。