Kurz and Napel (Optim Lett 10(6):1245–1256, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-015-0917-0) proved that the voting system of the EU council (based on the 2014 population data) cannot be represented as the intersection of six weighted games, i.e., its dimension is at least 7. This set a new record for real-world voting rules and the authors posed the exact determination as a challenge. Recently, Chen et al. (An upper bound on the dimension of the voting system of the European Union Council under the Lisbon rules, 2019, arXiv:1907.09711) showed that the dimension is at most 24. We provide the first improved lower bound and show that the dimension is at least 8.

Kurz和Napel（Optim Lett 10（6）：1245-1256，2015，https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-015-0917-0）证明了欧盟理事会的投票系统（基于2014年人口）数据）不能表示为六个加权博弈的交集，即它的维数至少为7。这为现实世界的投票规则创造了新记录，作者提出了确切的决定是一个挑战。最近，Chen等。（根据里斯本规则，欧盟理事会投票系统维度的上限，2019，arXiv：1907.09711）显示该维度最多为24。我们提供了第一个改进的下限，并表明该维度为至少8。