Since advances in brain-reading technology are changing traditional epistemic boundaries of the mind, yielding information from the brain that enables to draw inferences about particular mental states of individuals, the sustainability of the present framework of European human rights has been called into question. More specifically, it has been argued that in order to provide adequate human rights protection from non-consensual brain-reading, the right to freedom of thought should be revised, making it ‘fit for the future’ again. From the perspective of criminal justice, the present paper examines whether such a revision is necessary within the European legal context. It argues that under its current understanding, the right to freedom of thought would probably not cover the employment of most brain-reading applications in criminal justice. By contrast, the right to freedom of (non-)expression will provide legal protection in this regard and, at the same time, will also allow for certain exceptions. Hence, instead of revising the absolute right to freedom of thought, a legal approach tailored to non-consensual brain-reading could be developed under the already existing right not to convey information, ideas, and opinions as guaranteed under the freedom of (non-)expression. This might need to re-interpret the right to freedom of expression, rather than the right to freedom of thought.

中文翻译：

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欧洲的思想自由：“大脑阅读”技术的进步是否需要修订？

由于大脑阅读技术的进步正在改变思想的传统认识论边界，从大脑产生能够推断出个人特定心理状态的信息，因此人们对欧洲人权现行框架的可持续性提出了质疑。更具体地说，有人争辩说，为了提供适当的人权保护，防止未经同意的脑力阅读，应当修改思想自由权，使其再次“适合未来”。从刑事司法的角度来看，本文探讨了在欧洲法律背景下是否有必要进行这种修改。它辩称，在目前的理解下，思想自由权可能不会涵盖在刑事司法中使用大多数大脑阅读应用程序的权利。相比之下，（非）表达自由权将在这方面提供法律保护，同时也将允许某些例外。因此，除了修改绝对的思想自由权之外，还可以在已经存在的权利下开发一种针对非自愿的大脑阅读的法律方法，以不传达在（非自愿）自由下得到保证的信息，思想和观点。 ）表达。这可能需要重新解释言论自由权，而不是思想自由权。可以在不存在（非）表达自由所保证的不传达信息，思想和观点的现有权利下，制定针对非共识性大脑阅读的法律方法。这可能需要重新解释言论自由权，而不是思想自由权。可以在不存在（非）表达自由所保证的不传达信息，思想和观点的现有权利下，制定针对非共识性大脑阅读的法律方法。这可能需要重新解释言论自由权，而不是思想自由权。