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Trojan Horse Attacks, Decoy State Method, and Side Channels of Information Leakage in Quantum Cryptography
Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics ( IF 1.1 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-01 , DOI: 10.1134/s1063776120050064
S. N. Molotkov

Abstract

Early proofs of key secrecy in quantum cryptography systems were based on the assumption that the transmitting and receiving stations are completely isolated from the outside world—the eavesdropper. However, this condition cannot be implemented in practice since quantum cryptography systems are open systems in the sense that the eavesdropper may have indirect access, for example, through a fiber communication channel, to the critical elements of the equipment (phase modulators, intensity modulators, etc.) using active probing of the state of these elements. The state of the elements carries information about the transmitted key. In addition, the eavesdropper can use passive detection of side radiation from the receiving and transmitting equipment. Signals in side channels of information leakage may have extremely low intensity and are actually quantum signals. The eavesdropper may use the joint measurement of quantum information states in the communication channel and of states in various side channels of information leakage. The paper considers both passive attacks with measurement of side radiation and active attacks involving the probing of the states of the phase modulator and the intensity modulator, as well as backscattering radiation of single-photon avalanche detectors, which occurs during detecting information states on the receiver side. Combined attacks are also considered. The decoy state method is generalized with regard to active probing attacks, and boundaries for state parameters in side communication channels are obtained that guarantee secret key distribution for a given length of the communication channel.


中文翻译:

特洛伊木马攻击,诱骗状态方法和量子密码学中信息泄漏的旁通道

摘要

量子密码系统中密钥保密的早期证据是基于这样的假设,即发送站和接收站与外界(窃听者)完全隔离。但是,此条件在实践中无法实现,因为就密码窃听者可以通过光纤通信通道间接访问设备的关键元件(相位调制器,强度调制器,等)使用这些元素的状态的主动探测。元素的状态携带有关已传输密钥的信息。此外,窃听者可以使用被动检测来自接收和发送设备的侧面辐射。信息泄漏旁通道中的信号强度可能极低,实际上是量子信号。窃听者可以使用对通信信道中的量子信息状态和信息泄漏的各个侧信道中的状态的联合测量。本文考虑了测量侧面辐射的被动攻击和涉及探测相位调制器和强度调制器状态的主动攻击,以及在探测器上检测信息状态期间发生的单光子雪崩探测器的反向散射辐射。侧。还考虑了联合攻击。诱饵状态方法是针对主动探测攻击的通用方法,
更新日期:2020-09-01
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