Reviewed by:

• The Train and the Telegraph: A Revisionist History by Benjamin Sidney Michael Schwantes
• Edmund Russell (bio)

In 1876, to commemorate the first centenary of the United States, Nathaniel Currier and James Merritt Ives published a lithograph, “The Progress of the Century.” At the center of the lithograph, a telegrapher with his machine; behind him, three uses of steam engines—to drive a printing press, a steamboat, and a train. The lithograph expressed several American beliefs: that technology powered progress, that telegraphs and steam engines were the most transformative technologies of the age, and that one of the most important uses of steam engines was railroads.

Because Americans by 1876 were used to seeing telegraphs along railroad tracks, it is easy to assume that railroads and telegraphs immediately bonded. They had a lot to offer each other. Railroads could use telegraphs for business correspondence as well as train management. Telegraphs could build lines in railroad rights of way and have trains deliver construction and repair materials along the line. And because railroads and telegraphs transformed the way Americans did almost everything, from commerce to courtship, it is easy to think of them as a package. Together, Americans said in the nineteenth century, railroads and telegraphs annihilated time and space.

Benjamin Schwantes argues that telegraphs and railroads eventually became partners, but it was a long time coming. In the 1830s and 1840s, American railroads had learned to manage trains safely on single tracks through rigid schedules. When telegraphs began spreading in the mid-1840s, railroad managers saw little use for them. They worried about the [End Page 992] danger and unreliability of poorly built telegraphs as poles along tracks rotted, fell, and wrecked trains. Railroad leaders saw no reason to trust that agents employed by telegraph companies would prioritize railroad telegrams over other business, and timeliness was everything when it came to managing trains on single tracks.

Telegraphers liked the idea of building lines in railroad rights of way, and a few built lines along tracks before the Confederate Rebellion. They found, however, that railroads prioritized their own businesses, and sometimes damaged telegraphs. As long as the two technologies were owned by different firms, their interests pulled in different directions.

War is a common matchmaker for organizations and technologies, and the Confederate Rebellion was no different. Having organized military railroads and telegraphs, civilian managers in both sectors discovered there was more room for cooperation than they had foreseen.

After the rebellion, they transferred their new appreciation to private enterprises. Railroads increased their reliance on telegraphs, but the new managers often found this a frustrating experience. They hated transferring power—the ability to tell employees what to do—to telegraphers, especially those who worked for another company.

Railroads reduced this problem after the 1870s by hiring their own telegraphers. Now managers and telegraphers worked for the same company, but the railroads shot themselves in the foot by treating telegraphers badly. Long hours and low pay were the rule. Telegraphers got their first jobs with the railroads, but, as soon as they had enough experience, they went to work for telegraph companies that offered better working conditions. Small wonder that railroads found their inexperienced telegraphers, who might stay with a railroad for only a few months, unreliable. Eventually railroad managers found a new tool to replace telegraphs and telegraphers—telephones. Now managers could talk to distant employees without relying on telegraphers as intermediaries. Railroad telegraphy declined.

Schwantes does a fine job of explaining the complex, changing interaction between telegraphs and railroads. He builds his narrative on a deep foundation of research. The author is alive to the many interests at play in commerce, from enterprise-level (will the company benefit or suffer from adopting new technology?) to bureaucratic (will managers resent having to share power with telegraphers?). He charts the changes in the often-fraught relationship between railroads and telegraphs over time, until finally the railroads found a new partner, telephones. [End Page 993]

Edmund Russell is president of the American Society for Environmental History and the David M...

审核人：

• 火车和电报：本杰明·西德尼·迈克尔·史威特斯的修正主义历史
• 埃德蒙·罗素（生物）

为了纪念美国成立一百周年，纳撒尼尔·柯里尔（Nathaniel Currier）和詹姆斯·梅里特·艾夫斯（James Merritt Ives）于1876年出版了版画《世纪的进步》。在平版印刷机的中央，有一台电报机和他的机器。在他身后，使用了三种蒸汽机，分别用于驱动印刷机，汽船和火车。该版画表达了美国的以下几种信念：技术推动进步，电报和蒸汽机是该时代最具变革性的技术，蒸汽机最重要的用途之一是铁路。

由于到1876年美国人习惯于沿着铁轨看电报，因此很容易假设铁路和电报会立即联系在一起。他们互相提供了很多东西。铁路可以使用电报进行商务通信以及火车管理。电报机可以按照铁路通行权建造线路，并让火车沿着线路运送建筑和维修材料。而且由于铁路和电报改变了美国人从商务到求爱的几乎所有事情的方式，因此很容易将它们视为一揽子计划。美国人在一起说，在19世纪，铁路和电报消灭了时空。

本杰明·施万特斯（Benjamin Schwantes）认为，电报和铁路最终成为了合作伙伴，但这是很长的时间。在1830年代和1840年代，美国铁路学会了通过严格的时间表安全地管理单轨火车。当电报在1840年代中期开始传播时，铁路经理对它们几乎没有用处。他们担心[End End 992]不良的电报的危险性和不可靠性，因为沿着轨道的电线杆会旋转，掉落和毁坏火车。铁路领导者没有理由相信电报公司雇用的代理商会优先考虑电报而不是其他业务，而在单轨列车管理上，及时性就是一切。

电报员喜欢在铁路通行权上修建线路的想法，以及在同盟叛乱之前沿着轨道修建一些线路的想法。但是，他们发现铁路优先考虑自己的业务，有时会损坏电报。只要这两种技术由不同的公司拥有，它们的利益就会朝着不同的方向发展。

战争是组织和技术的常见媒人，同盟叛乱也不例外。在组织了军事铁路和电报机之后，这两个部门的文职管理人员都发现合作的空间超出了他们的预期。

叛乱后，他们将新的赞赏转移给了私营企业。铁路增加了对电报的依赖，但是新经理经常发现这令人沮丧。他们讨厌将权力（告诉员工做什么的能力）转移给电报员，尤其是为另一家公司工作的电报员。

1870年代后，铁路通过聘用了自己的电报员，减轻了这一问题。现在，经理和电报员曾在同一家公司工作，但铁路部门通过对电报员的恶劣对待使自己陷入困境。长时间工作和低薪是规则。电报员在铁路部门找到了第一份工作，但是一旦他们有了足够的经验，便开始为提供更好工作条件的电报公司工作。难怪铁路发现他们经验不足的电报员不可靠，他们可能只在铁路上呆了几个月。最终，铁路经理找到了一种新的工具来代替电报和电报员电话。现在，经理们可以与遥远的员工交谈，而无需依靠电报员作为中介。铁路电报拒绝了。

Schwantes在解释电报和铁路之间复杂而变化的交互方面做得很好。他的叙述建立在深刻的研究基础上。从企业级别（公司会受益还是采用新技术吗？）到官僚主义（经理会不会讨厌与电报员分享权力？），作者对商业中的许多利益都充满活力。他绘制了铁路和电报之间经常陷入困境的关系随时间变化的图表，直到铁路终于找到了一个新的合作伙伴，电话。[结束页993]

埃德蒙·罗素（Edmund Russell）是美国环境历史学会和戴维·米勒（David M ...