Abstract This paper studies independence of higher claims and independence of irrelevant claims on the domain of bargaining problems with claims. Independence of higher claims requires that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the higher claim of another agent. Independence of irrelevant claims states that the payoffs should not change when the claims decrease but remain higher than the payoffs. Interestingly, in conjunction with standard axioms from bargaining theory, these properties characterize a new constrained Nash solution, a constrained Kalai–Smorodinsky solution, and a constrained Kalai solution.

中文翻译：

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与更高或不相关的主张的独立性讨价还价

摘要 本文研究了与索赔讨价还价问题领域的更高索赔的独立性和无关索赔的独立性。更高要求的独立性要求代理人的收益不依赖于另一个代理人的更高要求。无关索赔的独立性表明，当索赔减少但仍高于支付时，收益不应改变。有趣的是，结合讨价还价理论的标准公理，这些属性表征了新的约束纳什解、约束 Kalai-Smorodinsky 解和约束 Kalai 解。