An oligopoly model with a leader in the class of linear demand and cost functions of agents is considered, and the dynamic processes of reflexive behavior in this model are analytically studied. Dynamic decision-making processes with the inaccurate beliefs of agents about the choice of competitors are implemented not through the optimal responses to their expected actions, but as repeated static games on a range of admissible responses. Such an approach to decision-making is demonstrated to be justified. Observing the current state of the market and considering current economic restrictions (competitiveness and profit), agents refine their outputs in game-to-game dynamics and take steps towards the current position of their goal. A Stackelberg leader and other agents with the Cournot response choose step sizes independently of each other. Sufficient conditions on the step sizes under which the dynamics converge to an equilibrium are established.

考虑一种在线性需求和代理成本函数类别中处于领先地位的寡头模型，并对该模型中反身行为的动态过程进行了分析研究。对代理人对竞争对手的选择抱有不正确信念的动态决策过程，并不是通过对他们预期行动的最佳响应来实现的，而是通过对一系列可接受响应的重复静态博弈来实现的。这种决策方法被证明是合理的。观察市场的当前状态并考虑当前的经济限制（竞争力和利润），代理商在游戏间动态中改进其输出，并朝着目标的当前位置迈出步骤。Stackelberg领导者和具有Cournot响应的其他代理选择步长彼此独立。