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Strategic technology commercialization in the supply chain under network effects
International Journal of Production Economics ( IF 12.0 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2020.107895
Wei Wang , Gaoyan Lyu , Wei Cui , Yongjian Li

Abstract We explore the optimal technology commercialization strategy of an inside innovator in the downstream of a two-tier supply chain when network effects exist via a game-theoretical framework. This setting incorporates in a unified model the two strategic incentives for the innovator to license to potential competitors for free, i.e., expanding the network size and driving down the wholesale price, thus it enables us to disclose how these two incentives interact with each other to influence the innovator's choice between the internal and external commercialization strategies. Our analyses reveal several interesting results. First, it is beneficial for the innovator to license to the entrant, even for free, when the relative quality of the low-end product provided by the latter is moderate. Second, when the network effects are weak and the quality of the low-end product to introduce is high, the innovator prefers the internal commercialization strategies, while the supplier and the consumers prefer the external commercialization strategy. Third, if licensing fees can be collected, the fixed-fee licensing contract dominates the royalty licensing contract when network effects are strong, or when the entrant is relatively weak. In addition, in the extended models, we point out that our key findings and insights are relatively robust with respect to the market structure in the upstream of the supply chain (monopolistic versus competitive) or the cost structure of the differentiated final products (homogeneous or heterogeneous), but they are somewhat different under alternative wholesale price mechanisms (uniform versus discriminatory).

中文翻译:

网络效应下供应链中的战略技术商业化

摘要 我们通过博弈论框架探索存在网络效应时二级供应链下游内部创新者的最佳技术商业化策略。这种设置将创新者免费许可给潜在竞争对手的两种战略激励措施合并到一个统一的模型中,即扩大网络规模和降低批发价格,从而使我们能够揭示这两种激励措施如何相互作用影响创新者在内部和外部商业化战略之间的选择。我们的分析揭示了几个有趣的结果。首先,当进入者提供的低端产品的相对质量适中时,创新者向进入者授予许可,即使是免费的,也是有益的。第二,当网络效应较弱且引入的低端产品质量较高时,创新者更倾向于内部商业化策略,而供应商和消费者更倾向于外部商业化策略。第三,如果可以收取许可费,当网络效应较强或进入者相对较弱时,固定费用许可合同将主导使用费许可合同。此外,在扩展模型中,我们指出,我们的主要发现和见解相对于供应链上游的市场结构(垄断与竞争)或差异化最终产品的成本结构(同质或异质性),但在替代批发价格机制(统一与歧视)下它们有些不同。
更新日期:2021-01-01
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