Abstract Perishability and developing a coordination mechanism for inventory systems with perishable items are the major concerns of marketing managers in a supply chain. In this study, we address a two-echelon supply chain problem for perishable items with a single vendor and a single buyer under the perishing cost and profit-sharing contract. The buyer adopts a time-based continuous-review control policy that works by taking both the stock level and the aging process of items into account. All of the items in an order have identical lifetimes, beyond which they become unusable and are disposed of from the buyer’s system. The aging process of items begins when they are unpacked and ready for consumption at the buyer. When items are held by the vendor, there is no aging process which results in no perishing at the vendor’s site. The vendor relies on a lot-based control policy, where its lot size is determined with respect to the order quantity of the buyer. We provide exact analytic expressions for the operating characteristics of the supply chain by using the renewal reward theorem. We propose a new coordination mechanism which is based on sharing perishing costs. Under this mechanism, the vendor pays a portion of perishing costs by which he stimulates the buyer to place orders with larger quantities. We analyze this coordination mechanism under vendor managed inventory and centralized settings. The goal is to determine the optimal policy parameters of the buyer and the vendor’s lot size by maximizing the expected profit of the supply chain under perishing cost and profit-sharing contract and the service level constraint at the buyer’s site. A sensitivity analysis is performed to investigate the value of the coordination mechanism. Our results reveal that the proposed coordination mechanism performs well when the unit perishing cost is low and the lifetime of items is short. Moreover, the marginal profits of the buyer and the vendor affect the coordination mechanism performance. Depending on perishing costs incurred at the buyer, the supply chain members can negotiate on their selling prices so as significant surplus profits are achieved under the proposed coordination mechanism.

中文翻译：

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易腐烂产品两级供应链利润分享合同

摘要 易腐烂性和为易腐烂物品的库存系统开发协调机制是供应链中营销经理的主要关注点。在这项研究中，我们解决了易腐烂物品的两梯队供应链问题，其中有一个供应商和一个买家，根据腐烂成本和利润分享合同。采购员采用基于时间的持续审查控制策略，该策略通过考虑库存水平和物品的老化过程来起作用。订单中的所有项目都具有相同的生命周期，超过此生命周期它们将无法使用并从买方的系统中处理掉。当物品被打开并准备好供买方消费时，物品的老化过程就开始了。当供应商持有物品时，不存在导致供应商现场没有腐烂的老化过程。供应商依赖于基于批次的控制策略，其批量大小取决于买方的订单数量。我们使用更新奖励定理为供应链的运行特征提供精确的解析表达式。我们提出了一种新的协调机制，该机制基于共享消亡成本。在这种机制下，供应商支付一部分的灭亡成本，以此刺激买方下更大数量的订单。我们在供应商管理库存和集中设置下分析这种协调机制。目标是通过最大化供应链在濒死成本和利润分享合同下的预期利润以及买方站点的服务水平约束来确定买方和卖方批量大小的最优策略参数。进行敏感性分析以研究协调机制的价值。我们的结果表明，当单位灭亡成本低且物品寿命短时，所提出的协调机制表现良好。此外，买方和卖方的边际利润会影响协调机制的性能。根据买方产生的死亡成本，供应链成员可以协商他们的销售价格，从而在提议的协调机制下实现显着的盈余利润。买方和卖方的边际利润影响协调机制的性能。根据买方产生的死亡成本，供应链成员可以协商他们的销售价格，从而在提议的协调机制下实现显着的盈余利润。买方和卖方的边际利润影响协调机制的性能。根据买方产生的死亡成本，供应链成员可以协商他们的销售价格，从而在提议的协调机制下实现显着的盈余利润。