The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance—in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of representations—is most appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account—an organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content involved in the ‘aboutness’ or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.

中文翻译：

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自由能原理是语义学的正式理论吗？从变分密度动力学到神经和表型表示

本文的目的有两个：（1）评估神经表征的构造是否在变分自由能原理及其推论过程理论、主动推理下起解释作用；(2) 如果是，评估哪种哲学立场——与表征的本体论和认识论地位有关——最合适。我们专注于非现实主义（通货紧缩和虚构主义工具主义）方法。我们考虑心理表征的紧缩解释，根据该解释，神经表征的解释相关内容是数学的，而不是认知的，以及虚构主义或工具主义的解释，根据该解释，表征是服务于解释（和其他）目的的科学有用的虚构。在回顾了自由能原理和主动推理之后，我们认为自由能原理下的适应性表型模型可用于提供形式语义，使我们能够将语义内容分配给特定的表型状态（远离平衡的马尔可夫系统的内部状态）。我们提出了一种修正的虚构主义描述——一种以有机体为中心的虚构主义或工具主义。我们认为，在自由能原则下，即使对神经表征的内容进行紧缩解释，也许可诉诸于认知系统的“关于性”或意向性所涉及的语义内容类型；因此，我们的立场与现实主义立场一致，但基于与现实主义立场不同的假设。