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Deceptive Appearances: the Turing Test, Response-Dependence, and Intelligence as an Emotional Concept
Minds and Machines ( IF 7.4 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-12 , DOI: 10.1007/s11023-020-09533-8
Michael Wheeler

The Turing Test is routinely understood as a behaviourist test for machine intelligence. Diane Proudfoot (Rethinking Turing’s Test, Journal of Philosophy, 2013) has argued for an alternative interpretation. According to Proudfoot, Turing’s claim that intelligence is what he calls ‘an emotional concept’ indicates that he conceived of intelligence in response-dependence terms. As she puts it: ‘Turing’s criterion for “thinking” is…: x is intelligent (or thinks) if in the actual world, in an unrestricted computer-imitates-human game, x appears intelligent to an average interrogator’. The role of the famous test is thus to provide the conditions in which to examine the average interrogator’s responses. I shall argue that Proudfoot’s analysis falls short. The philosophical literature contains two main models of response-dependence, what I shall call the transparency model and the reference-fixing model. Proudfoot resists the thought that Turing might have endorsed one of these models to the exclusion of the other. But the details of her own analysis indicate that she is, in fact, committed to the claim that Turing’s account of intelligence is grounded in a transparency model, rather than a reference-fixing one. By contrast, I shall argue that while Turing did indeed conceive of intelligence in response-dependence terms, his account is grounded in a reference-fixing model, rather than a transparency one. This is fortunate (for Turing), because, as an account of intelligence, the transparency model is arguably problematic in a way that the reference-fixing model isn’t.

中文翻译:

欺骗性表象:图灵测试、响应依赖和作为情感概念的智力

图灵测试通常被理解为机器智能的行为主义测试。Diane Proudfoot(Rethinking Turing's Test, Journal of Philosophy, 2013)提出了另一种解释。根据 Proudfoot 的说法,图灵声称智力是他所谓的“情感概念”,这表明他是在反应依赖的术语中构思智力的。正如她所说:“图灵对“思考”的标准是……:如果在现实世界中,在一个不受限制的计算机模拟人类游戏中,x 对普通审讯者来说是聪明的,那么 x 是聪明的(或思考)。因此,著名的测试的作用是提供条件来检查询问者的平均反应。我认为 Proudfoot 的分析是不够的。哲学文献包含两种主要的反应依赖模型,我将称之为透明模型和参考固定模型。Proudfoot 反对图灵可能认可其中一个模型而排斥另一个模型的想法。但她自己的分析细节表明,事实上,她坚持图灵对智能的解释基于透明模型而不是参考固定模型的说法。相比之下,我将争辩说,虽然图灵确实从响应依赖的术语中构想了智能,但他的解释是基于参考固定模型,而不是透明模型。这是幸运的(对于图灵而言),因为作为对智能的解释,透明模型可以说是有问题的,而参考修复模型则没有。Proudfoot 反对图灵可能认可其中一个模型而排斥另一个模型的想法。但她自己的分析细节表明,事实上,她坚持图灵对智能的解释基于透明模型而不是参考固定模型的说法。相比之下,我将争辩说,虽然图灵确实从响应依赖的术语中构想了智能,但他的解释是基于参考固定模型,而不是透明模型。这是幸运的(对于图灵而言),因为作为对智能的解释,透明模型可以说是有问题的,而参考修复模型则没有。Proudfoot 反对图灵可能认可其中一个模型而排斥另一个模型的想法。但她自己的分析细节表明,事实上,她坚持图灵对智能的解释基于透明模型而不是参考固定模型的说法。相比之下,我将争辩说,虽然图灵确实从响应依赖的术语中构想了智能,但他的解释是基于参考固定模型,而不是透明模型。这是幸运的(对于图灵而言),因为作为对智能的解释,透明模型可以说是有问题的,而参考修复模型则没有。致力于声称图灵对情报的解释基于透明模型,而不是参考固定模型。相比之下,我将争辩说,虽然图灵确实从响应依赖的术语中构想了智能,但他的解释是基于参考固定模型,而不是透明模型。这是幸运的(对于图灵而言),因为作为对智能的解释,透明模型可以说是有问题的,而参考修复模型则没有。致力于声称图灵对情报的解释基于透明模型,而不是参考固定模型。相比之下,我将争辩说,虽然图灵确实从响应依赖的术语中构想了智能,但他的解释是基于参考固定模型,而不是透明模型。这是幸运的(对于图灵而言),因为作为对智能的解释,透明模型可以说是有问题的,而参考修复模型则没有。
更新日期:2020-08-12
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