Drawing on ‘interpretational’ accounts of scientific representation, I argue that the use of so-called ‘toy models’ provides no particular philosophical puzzle. More specifically; I argue that once one gives up the idea that models are accurate representations of their targets only if they are appropriately similar, then simple and highly idealized models can be accurate in the same way that more complex models can be. Their differences turn on trading precision for generality, but, if they are appropriately interpreted, toy models should nevertheless be considered accurate representations. A corollary of my discussion is a novel way of thinking about idealization more generally: idealized models may distort features of their targets, but they needn’t misrepresent them.

中文翻译：

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这不是游戏：用玩具模型准确表示

借鉴科学表征的“解释性”解释，我认为使用所谓的“玩具模型”并没有提供特别的哲学难题。进一步来说; 我认为，一旦人们放弃了模型只有在它们适当相似的情况下才能准确表示其目标的想法，那么简单和高度理想化的模型就可以像更复杂的模型一样准确。它们的差异取决于一般性的交易精度，但是，如果对它们进行适当的解释，玩具模型仍应被视为准确的表示。我的讨论的一个推论是一种更普遍地思考理想化的新方法：理想化模型可能会扭曲其目标的特征，但他们不必歪曲它们。