Within eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition we can distinguish at least three main theoretical positions: (i) Buffon’s mechanism, (ii) Reimarus’ theory of instincts, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy. In this paper, I adopt a philosophical perspective on this debate and argue that in order to fully understand the justification Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy gave for their respective theories, we must pay special attention to the theoretical virtues these naturalists alluded to while justifying their position. These theoretical virtues have received little to no attention in the literature on eighteenth-century animal cognition, but figure prominently in the justification of the mechanist, instinctive, and sensationalist theories of animal behavior. Through my philosophical study of the role of theoretical virtues in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition, we obtain a deeper understanding of how theoretical virtues were conceptualized in eighteenth-century science and how they influenced the justification of theories of animal cognition.

中文翻译：

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18世纪有关动物认知的辩论中的理论美德。

在18世纪有关动物认知的辩论中，我们可以区分至少三个主要的理论立场：（i）布冯机制，（ii）赖马鲁斯的本能理论，以及（iii）康迪拉克和勒洛伊的轰动论。在本文中，我对这一辩论采取了哲学观点，并指出，为了充分理解布冯，雷马鲁斯，康迪拉克和勒罗伊为其各自的理论提供的辩护，我们必须特别注意这些博物学家在论证时所提出的理论美德。证明他们的立场。这些理论优点在18世纪的动物认知研究中几乎没有受到关注，但是在机械，本能和轰动主义动物行为理论的辩护中占有重要地位。